I. INTRODUCTION
Recessions create fiscal stress for local governments, because their two most important revenue sources -the property tax base and intergovernmental transfers -both tend to fall during a recession. The tax base declines as property values fall and transfers are cut back because the federal and state governments find themselves dealing with their own budgetary problems. While the fiscal problems of local governments as they relate to the business cycle have long been of interest, in recent years this interest has intensified due to the effects of the Great Recession (GR). Not only did the GR impose unprecedented levels of fiscal stress on cities and counties, but at this writing, more than five years after the end of the GR, most local governments still have not returned to their revenue and employment levels from before the downturn. Despite this interest, to our knowledge, the most important question remains largely unanswered: How do cities and counties typically respond to the exogenous fiscal shocks of recession-induced losses in tax base and intergovernmental transfers? Do they offset potential revenue losses by raising their millage rates? If this millage rate offset is less than complete, do they cut their expenditures? And if they do cut their expenditures, are the cuts across-the-board or are they focused on particular budget categories? In particular, do less essential public services, like culture and recreation, bear the brunt of the cuts or do more core services, like public safety, get jeopardized? Also of concern is whether there are cuts in human services that target poor, elderly, and disabled residents. Answers to these questions are crucial in assessing the social costs of tax base and intergovernmental transfer losses at the local level and possibly averting the worst consequences of these losses moving forward.
In this paper we first develop a theoretical framework which recognizes that cities and counties do not respond to negative fiscal shocks in a vacuum. Local governments consider the likelihood of capital flight in deciding their millage rate and expenditure responses. This likelihood is posited to depend on the magnitudes of a local government's millage rate, expenditures, and population size relative to its competitors. Next, we draw upon our theory to specify empirical models that allow us to address the questions raised above. 1 The models are estimated using unique panel databases on local governments in the state of Florida. The panels, one for cities and one for counties, are both long and recent, running from 1995 through 2011.
2 By first differencing the data we are able to control for unobservable heterogeneity across these local area governments that otherwise might have biased our results.
In addition to estimating millage rate and total expenditure models, we also estimate first differenced expenditure equations for individual budget categories, broken down into 7 categories for cities and 11 categories for counties. The additional categories for counties reflect the fact that in Florida courts are strictly a county government function. The categorical expenditure models enable us to determine which public services are the most and least affected when local governments suffer losses in the property tax base and in intergovernmental transfers.
In the next section we review the theoretical and empirical literatures that have examined local government responses to fiscal pressure. Section III develops our theoretical model, which suggests that differences in responses among counties and cities to losses in tax base or intergovernmental transfers are a function of the competition they face 1 Our analysis bears similarities to the Poterba (1994) analysis of the expenditure and tax adjustments made by state governments to fiscal crises. Local governments in Florida, like most state governments, are constitutionally prohibited from using deficit finance. Hence, both types of government must make hard choices, raising taxes or reducing outlays to restore fiscal balance in response to negative fiscal shocks. Poterba shows that among states fiscal institutions and political factors affect these choices, while our analysis focuses on how these choices are affected by differences in the monopoly power of local governments. 2 We do not study school districts because the data are not available. In addition, school boards have less discretion than cities and counties in setting their millage rates, independent of state influence.
from other governments. Section IV describes our panel data sets and reports statistics describing how city and county budgets in Florida have evolved over the past two decades. In Section V we describe each of the first differenced panel data models that we estimate. Results from estimating our millage rate, total expenditure, and categorical expenditure models for cities and counties are reported in Section VI. Section VII states our conclusions and offers suggestions for future work.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Surprisingly, there are to our knowledge no statistical studies that provide evidence on city and county responses to the fiscal crisis that developed at the local government level after the onset of the GR in 2007. Perhaps time has had to pass for sufficient post-crash data to become available to study these responses. Alternatively, the data needed to study these responses are difficult to obtain. While current total expenditure, millage rate, and property tax base data for cities and counties may be available from state agencies, past data may not be. Furthermore, the acquisition of categorical budget data usually requires the examination of individual city and county annual budgets. This is a daunting task, especially in light of the fact that historical data are needed to build panel databases that avoid the estimation of simple cross-sectional models which produce results that are susceptible to omitted variable bias.
There are, however, statistical studies that rely on earlier data to examine how local governments respond to exogenous shocks in their fiscal resources. There is also descriptive, case study evidence both prior to and after the GR that survey city leaders on how they have responded to fiscal pressures. In this section, we review the case study evidence, examine the statistical evidence, and review the tax competition literature as it applies to local governments. Empirical studies within this literature have found that the county property tax rate and the rates of neighboring cities influence the rate set by a municipality. Hence, it may be important to control for these effects to avoid omitted variable bias in estimating the responses of local governments to losses in their fiscal resources.
A. Case Study Evidence
In an early seminal paper, Wolman (1983) reviews the very early case study evidence on fiscally stressed cities in both the United States and the United Kingdom to support his model of local government decision-making in response to fiscal pressure. His model suggests that cities follow a sequence of steps in their response to declines in available resources. These steps are predicted based upon his view of the responses of service recipients to cuts and taxpayers to higher tax rates: Cuts in services cause immediate negative feedback from the groups that are affected, while increases in taxes are not a liability to the public official until the next election. The first step in dealing with fiscal pressure is for the city to draw down saved reserves, leaving both taxes and expenditures unchanged. Next, taxes are raised under the constraint that they cannot be raised so high that the incumbent administration will be voted out of office in the next election. Third, expenditures are cut on maintenance and replacement of equipment and buildings. Finally, expenditures are reduced that jeopardize the current quality of public services. Wolman's model can be characterized as a descriptive public choice model, where the public official's response to fiscal pressure is driven by the desire to remain in office.
After Wolman, there is a dearth of case study evidence until after the GR. Since then the National League of Cities and State and Local Government Review have conducted surveys of cities to monitor how they have coped with fewer resources. 3 The responses have been quite varied but there is clear evidence in support of Wolman's sequential "steps" -first tapped are "rainy day" funds, and then capital expenditures are cut before current spending. When the latter is cut, the emphasis is on less essential services, such as public works, libraries, and parks and recreation. Survey responses also suggest that the millage rate offset is not generally used by cities to balance their budgets.
4 Particularly pertinent to the present study is the perception of city administrators that cuts in intergovernmental aid and loss in tax base have had a major negative influence on their government's fiscal picture.
More in-depth case study evidence on cities' response to the fiscal crisis brought on by the GR is provided by Nelson (2012) . She conducts a comparative case study analysis of 16 U.S. municipalities that involves researching news sources and municipal documents and, where document analysis is insufficient, directly contacting city administrators. She also finds that cities have adopted diverse strategies to cope with fewer resources. She concludes, however, that they have avoided "drastic" cuts in service provision by raising fees and utility rates, delaying new capital projects, and deferring maintenance expenditures.
B. Statistical Evidence
As noted above, we are unaware of any statistical analyses examining how local governments coped with the GR. There are, however, a number of studies that have investigated the impact of the housing market crash on the revenues of local governments. More relevant to the current analysis are several recent studies that attempted to forecast local governments' response to the fiscal pressures brought on by the GR.
The first category of studies includes Lutz, Molloy, and Shan (2011) , Doerner and Ihlanfeldt (2011), and Alm, Buschman, and Sjoquist (2011) . Lutz, Molloy, and Shan conduct two analyses: The first examines how decreases in housing values affect local government revenues, and the second examines the relationship between housing market 3 The National League of Cities surveys are annual, include 324 cities, and are conducted by both mail and email (Hoene and Pagano, 2009 , 2010 , 2012 . The survey conducted by State and Local Government Review was an online survey that included 438 counties and 142 cities (Perlman and Benton, 2012) . 4 For example, in the most recent League survey, only 22 percent of cities indicated that they increased their property tax rate in 2012. While the State and Local Government Review survey included both cities and counties, it is not possible to determine from the responses the extent to which counties pursue the millage rate offset.
deflation and state tax revenues. Most pertinent to the present study are the results from their first analysis where they estimate in separate regressions the elasticity of property tax revenue with respect to a house price index. The results show that property tax revenues do not decrease following house price declines. Lutz, Molloy, and Shan explain their findings by suggesting that they probably reflect significant lags between changes in market and assessed values and the use of the millage rate offset by policymakers. Doerner and Ihlanfeldt use panel data on Florida cities to estimate the relationship between revenues per capita within specific categories to a repeat sales housing price index constructed separately for each city. Housing prices are found to affect total revenues through a number of pathways, such as new construction, assessed values, millage rates, and revenues coming from sources other than ad valorem taxes. Over all of the pathways they find that housing prices have had little effect on total city revenue per capita. They explain their findings by noting that Florida has a catch-up provision that allows increases in assessed values as long as the assessed value is less than the market value, even if market values are falling.
Alm, Buschman, and Sjoquist demonstrate that there is considerable heterogeneity across communities in the impact that falling housing values have had on property tax revenues, but that substantial numbers of local governments have avoided any budgetary impact from declining housing values. They also provide evidence from school districts in Georgia which supports the assertion by Lutz, Molloy, and Shan that local governments frequently offset property tax revenue changes that would have occurred from changing house values by changing the millage rate in the opposite direction (the millage rate offset).
The above three studies all conclude that the housing market crash had little impact on the budgets of local governments. Of particular interest to our analysis is that two of the studies point to the millage rate offset as the source of property tax revenue stability. While the conclusions of these studies may have obtained soon after the crash occurred, which is the time period covered by these studies, it is now clear that they do not correctly describe the full GR effect on local governments. Revenues eventually did fall creating major fiscal crises for cities and counties. The delayed effect of the GR on local governments can be attributed to the fact that assessed values are generally not kept current with market values, but rather lag changes in market values by a number of years.
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Two studies attempt to provide some insight on how cities were likely to respond to the reductions in their fiscal resources brought on by the GR and housing market crash. Chernick, Langley, and Reschovsky (2011) develop simple forecasting models based upon data on large U.S. cities, while Skidmore and Scorsone (2011) base their expectations on the responses of Michigan cities to their significant and ongoing fiscal challenges.
Chernick, Langley, and Reschovsky use data on the 109 largest U.S. cities covering the years 1997-2008 to estimate property tax revenue and total expenditure equations. The results from their regressions are then used to forecast taxes and expenditures for the time period 2009-2013. They predict that real per capita spending in the average central city would be reduced by about 7 percent during the forecast period, and that spending cuts would be substantially greater in the cities hit hardest by the economic recession and the housing market collapse.
Skidmore and Scorsone use data on Michigan cities over the years [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] to estimate expenditure equations, in which expenditures are broken down into capital and current expenditures, with the latter further broken down by functional category. Their key independent variable is a measure of fiscal stress, defined as the difference between fiscal capacity and expenditure needs. They find that in response to fiscal stress Michigan cities cut their capital expenditures and their expenditures in the General Government, Public Works, and Parks and Recreation categories. Expenditures in essential services such as Public Safety were generally not adversely affected. The millage rate offset as a mechanism for dealing with fiscal stress is not explored.
Regarding the latter, Dye and Reschovsky (2008) investigate whether local governments respond to cuts in state aid by raising their millage rates. The millage rate offset mechanism generally refers to local governments raising their millage rates in response to reductions in their property tax base, but nothing prevents a local government from raising its millage rate to offset losses in intergovernmental transfers with higher property tax revenues. Using national data covering the years 2002-2004 from the U.S. Census Bureau's State and Local Government Finances, Dye and Reschovsky find that on average school districts increased property taxes by 23 cents for each dollar cut in state aid, suggesting a millage rate offset of roughly 25 percent.
A limitation of the above three studies is that they do not recognize that local governments compete against neighboring jurisdictions for business investment and the degree of this competition may affect their responses. In Section III we develop a theoretical framework that suggests the responses of local governments to a loss of fiscal resources will depend on the degree of monopoly power they possess.
C. The Tax Competition Literature
In modeling the tax rate and expenditure responses of local governments to losses in their fiscal resources one must control for horizontal and vertical tax competition among local governments that would occur in the absence of these losses.
6 Horizontal tax competition is suggested by theories of "exit" (tax competition) and "voice" (yardstick competition). Exit theory maintains that the home jurisdiction sets its tax rate with an eye toward capital flight, which will depend on the tax rates of competing jurisdictions relative to the home jurisdiction. A well known conclusion of exit theory is that public goods are undersupplied, because each community keeps its tax rate low in an attempt to preserve its tax base (Wilson, 1999) . Voice theory involves information spillovers across jurisdictions. As developed by Besley and Case (1995) , voters in the home jurisdiction look at public services and taxes in other jurisdictions to judge whether their own government is wasting resources and therefore could operate more efficiently. Elected officials are aware of their electorate's interjurisdictional comparisons and therefore to remain in office set the community's tax rate to mimic the tax rates of competing jurisdictions.
Most of the empirical studies that have explored horizontal tax competition have estimated reaction functions, which show how a jurisdiction responds to the tax rate choices of competing jurisdictions in deciding upon its own tax rate. While the results obtained from estimating these models cannot be used to distinguish between the relevance of exit versus voice theories, they do show that strategic interaction exists among local governments. Recent studies on U.S. local governments by Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) and Wu and Hendrick (2009) find that the home jurisdiction's tax rate responds positively to an average of the tax rates of competing jurisdictions, suggesting, in the game-theoretic language of Brueckner and Saavedra, that the tax rates of competing communities are "strategic complements".
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In addition to the horizontal tax competition that occurs among governments at the same level, there may exist vertical tax competition between governments at different levels. Wu and Hendrick (2009) , who provide to our knowledge the only evidence on vertical tax competition at the local level, conclude that the most compelling case in favor of such competition is that city and county services are related in residents' utility functions, either as substitutes or complements. If they are substitutes, the expectation is that a reduction (increase) in the county's tax rate will cause a city to increase (decrease) its tax rate in order to finance changes in service levels that will offset service reductions made by the county. If they are complements, cities will change their rates to follow tax and expenditure changes made by the county in order to finance expenditure changes that satisfy changes in the demand for matching services. Wu and Hendrick estimate a reaction function explaining the tax rates of Florida cities that includes the county tax rate, along with an average of the tax rates of competing cities. Their results show that a city will lower its rate in response to an increase in its county's rate, suggesting that city and county services are substitute goods.
The estimation of reaction functions presents a number of econometric challenges. Chief among them are the endogeneity of neighboring jurisdictions' tax rates and the emergence of false evidence of strategic interaction arising from unobservable determinants of policy choices that are correlated across jurisdictions (Brueckner, 2006) . In large part, these problems arise from the use of cross-sectional data which are avoided by our use of panel data. Hence, while not the primary purpose of this paper, we provide new evidence on tax competition that may be more reliable than that obtained from the estimation of reaction functions. Indeed, our approach to tax competition offers three additional advantages. First, we recognize that strategic interaction may affect both the tax and expenditure decisions of local governments and therefore we account for it in both our tax rate and expenditure models. Second, we explore the possibility that a county's budgetary decisions are affected by those of the cities located within its borders. This extends the research of Wu and Hendrick, who limited their investigation of vertical competition to whether cities respond to the tax rate changes by the county within which they are located. Third, we specify our models to allow upward and downward movements in other jurisdictions' expenditures and tax rates to have different effects on the home jurisdiction's determination of these same variables. That is, we allow for asymmetrical effects, while previous studies have assumed that effects are symmetrical.
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section we develop a simple theoretical framework that shows a city will respond differently to a loss in its fiscal resources depending on the degree of monopoly power it possesses. We then draw upon the model to develop the hypothesis that counties have more monopoly power than cities.
Cities face a business investment demand curve that includes a tax price of investment that equals property taxes paid per dollar of public service benefits received. The tax price can increase either as a result of an increase in the property tax rate or a reduction in public service benefits. A less elastic business investment demand curve implies a city (or county) has greater monopoly power. With more monopoly power, a city can raise its tax price in response to a loss in its tax base or intergovernmental transfers with less fear of capital flight.
8,9 Hence, we expect that a city with greater monopoly power will raise its tax price more in response to a loss in its fiscal resources. 10 The monopoly power of a city varies inversely with the number of substitute locations outside the city. As the number of substitutes decreases the investment demand curve becomes less elastic, and the city possesses greater monopoly power. 11 We use this information to predict heterogeneous responses to a loss in fiscal resources for similar cities located in different metropolitan areas.
For simplicity, assume there is a single firm in city j and that cities j and k are the only cities in county m. The firm is defined to have a substitute located in k if
where A equals expected monetary benefits and T is property taxes, both expressed as present values per dollar of capital investment, and c is the one-time cost of relocation from j to k. 12 In words, if there is a location in k that yields net benefits equal to or greater than the firm's present location in j, then the firm has a substitute in k.
13 Whether (1) obtains depends on the size of j relative to k, the tax rate of j relative to that of k, and the expected benefits of j relative to those of k.
The relevance of size as it affects (1) stems from three factors. First, assume that j is small relative to k. Then there will be many sites outside j in k that could potentially satisfy (1). As the relative size of j increases, these potential sites dwindle in number until, in the limit, j reaches the size of m and j is a pure monopoly city with no substitutes within the county. Second, assume that the firm initially chose the optimal location within j, implying that the highest possible A within j was selected. If the A provided by alternative locations relative to the home location declines with distance, then a small j increases the likelihood of finding an A k that approximates A j .
14 Controlling for T j and T k , this increases the probability of satisfying (1). Third, size affects the cost of relocation (c) from j to k. As the size of j increases so does the distance between the home location in j and the alternative location in k. Distance affects the cost of relocation for two reasons. First, as distance increases an increasing number of the firm's customers will find it too costly to travel to the new location, causing a loss in their patronage. Second, as distance increases the firm must pay higher wages to compensate its workers 11 The idea that cities with fewer substitutes possess monopoly power is prominent in the literature on land use regulations. The major hypothesis is that cities with monopoly power adopt development restrictions that raise housing prices and existing residents' welfare at the expense of outsiders (White, 1975; Ellickson, 1977; Hamilton, 1978; Fischel, 1980) . 12 Hereafter, we refer to T as the millage rate. 13 Our model assumes that in its response to a loss in resources a city fears a loss in capital to only other cities within the home county and not to cities located outside of the home county. While in some cases a location in a city outside the home county may satisfy (1) (for example, if the home city and the alternative city are located near one another on opposite sides of the county line), generally we expect this not to be the case. In comparison to alternative locations within the home county, locations outside the home county are less likely to be substitutes because of differences in county government services and the business regulatory environment. 14 As an example, A could be the cost savings generated by agglomeration economies. These savings are known to diminish rapidly with distance from their source. For example, Rosenthal and Strange (2006) report that for most industry groups the cost savings from agglomeration are much smaller at five miles than at one mile and even smaller at a distance of 10 miles from the source.
for their greater commuting costs. 15 Hence, as the size of j increases relative to k, the investment demand curve facing j becomes less elastic, because fewer of the locations in k satisfy (1) and are substitutes.
The relative tax rate of j affects whether its firm has a substitute in k by affecting j's relative attractiveness. Given A k and A j , the probability that the firm has a substitute in k declines as the ratio of T j to T k declines. The idea is that even if k's expected benefits exceed those of j's, if the tax advantage of j over k is large enough, the firm will not have a substitute in k. Similarly, as the expected benefits of j over k increase, holding constant T j and T k , the probability will decline that j has a substitute in k. An important factor affecting A j and A k are each city's expenditures on public services.
The factors that give monopoly power to city j -a large relative size and a low relative tax rate -are expected to be positively related to the amount j raises its millage rate in response to a loss in its fiscal resources. A loss in resources is also expected to cause city j to make larger expenditure cuts if it is of larger relative size or has a higher level of expenditures relative to city k.
Suppose now we add county n, which together with m defines the metropolitan area. Just as cities j and k compete for business investment, so will counties m and n. In addition, paralleling the results for city j, the elasticity of county m's demand curve will depend on its size, tax rate, and expected benefits relative to those of n. How will the elasticity of city j's investment demand curve compare to that of county m? Because of its larger size, the county will have greater monopoly power than the city for the same reasons size affects the monopoly power of city j: Larger size decreases the firm's chances of leaving the jurisdiction and finding a substitute site and maintaining the benefits provided by the home location, and it increases the cost of relocation. 16 Thus, in response to the same loss in fiscal resources, county m is expected to raise its tax price by more in comparison to city j.
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15 Mulalic, Van Ommeren, and Pilegaard (2014) demonstrate that a one kilometer increase in commuting distance induces a wage increase of 0.15 percent measured three years after the relocation. They improve upon early work showing wage compensation for longer commutes following firm relocation (e.g., Zax, 1991) by avoiding a range of endogeneity issues. 16 The analysis is based on the average firm within city j and county m. Regardless of the size of the county, there are expected to be individual cases where the firm is close enough to the boundary of another county that it can move to that county without sacrificing the benefits of its current location (i.e., without losing agglomeration economies or customers or having to pay higher wages to compensate its workers for a longer commute). 17 The sources of monopoly power that we have identified suggest that counties have absolute monopoly power and not just greater monopoly power in comparison to cities. However, it is important to distinguish new firm location from existing firm relocation. Without relocation costs, new firms are highly if not perfectly mobile across states. In contrast, existing firms pay dearly if they move away from their home county -agglomeration economies and customers are lost and workers must be compensated for having to make a longer commute or a physical move.
Like a city, a county has two options to raise its tax price -it can increase its millage rate or cut its expenditures. However, counties may find their use of the second option limited or closed by state government. Counties typically face mandates from the state to provide far more services than cities. This practice places a bound on the extent county expenditures can be cut, especially in those areas where mandates are more prevalent, such as in health care. Hence, despite their greater monopoly power, it is a priori ambiguous whether counties will cut their expenditures by more than cities in response to a loss in fiscal resources.
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Thus far we have treated a loss in tax base and a loss in intergovernmental transfers the same, under a single umbrella as "fiscal resources." However, local governments may respond differently to a loss in tax base in comparison to a loss in transfers. Two predictions are that:
• Local governments will increase their millage rates more in response to a loss in tax base in comparison to a loss in transfers. This prediction is based on the idea that taxpayers are more concerned with the size of their payment than the rate they pay. 19 The payment is the product of the millage rate and the assessed value of the house. Essentially, the tax payment serves as a reference point for the taxpayer. If the millage rate is raised to offset lower assessed values (i.e., a lower tax base), the payment remains the same, the reference point is unchanged, and voter wrath is avoided. On the other hand, if the millage rate is raised to offset a loss in transfers, a larger tax payment will result and there is voter discontent with the incumbent administration.
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• A loss in tax base will cause less targeted cuts in expenditures than will a loss in transfers. Assuming a less than complete millage rate offset, a lower tax base will reduce property tax revenues. These revenues are unconditional in the sense that they are not earmarked for any specific purpose but rather represent a significant portion of a local government's general fund. In comparison, intergovernmental transfers are a mix of federal grants, state grants, and revenue sharing. While revenue sharing funds are unconditional, grants tend to be categorical. Hence, a loss in transfers is expected to cause the expenditures in some budget categories to fall more than in others.
IV. DATA
In this section we describe our data. We then report per capita means of the variables for cities and counties for selected years of our panels.
A. Data Description
This study relies on two primary sources of data: the Florida Department of Financial Services (FDFS) City and County Annual Financial Reports 21 and the Florida Department of Revenue (FDOR) Annual County Property Tax Rolls. 22 The FDFS data come from budgetary data that each city and county is required to submit after each fiscal year. In these audited reports, local governments are required by the FDFS to report total current and capital expenditures and current expenditures broken down by the categories described in Table 1 . Also reported are revenues broken down by category, which allow us to obtain the annual amount of intergovernmental transfers received by each county and city. These transfers are the sum of federal grants, state grants, and shared state revenues. The FDFS data cover the years 1995-2011.
The FDOR data set comprises county tax rolls from each of Florida's 67 county property appraisers. Annual preparation is required by statute and is supervised by the FDOR. Tax rolls are collected for the purpose of monitoring the performance of county tax assessors. Spanning the years from 1995 to 2011, these rolls align with the FDFS data by year and across jurisdictions. From the rolls we obtain the millage rate for each year of our panels for each county and city. Within each jurisdiction the millage rate is the same for all property, regardless of its use. We also obtain the "taxable value" of the jurisdiction's property tax base. The taxable value of a property is the assessed value minus all exemptions; that is, it is the value that is multiplied by the millage rate to determine the property tax bill.
We use the FDFS and the FDOR data to construct four data sets -a balanced and an unbalanced panel, one each for all cities and all counties. The balanced panel for cities (counties) includes 274 cities (67 counties) that have no missing values for four selected years of our panel: 1995 (the first year of the panel), 2000 (a middle panel year), 2007 (the beginning year of the housing market crash and GR), and 2011 (the last year of the panel). The unbalanced panel includes all year/jurisdiction observations, regardless of whether a city or county has missing values for a particular year. The balanced panels are used below to follow the same set of jurisdictions over time to produce mean statistics describing their budgets. The use of the unbalanced panels for this purpose may result in mean expenditures or mean revenues changing from year to year due to differences in the composition of the sample. The unbalanced panel data sets are used to estimate 
B. A Preliminary Look at the Data
The real per capita means of the variables (in 2011 dollars) in our panels for the selected years are reported in Tables 2 and 3 for cities and counties, respectively. The increase in property tax bases was dramatic from 1995 to 2007, with the mean city and county experiencing increases of 116 and 127 percent, respectively. The crash in real estate markets caused a complete reversal in tax base growth, with the city and county tax bases plummeting by 29 and 38 percent between 2007 and 2011.
While the changes in intergovernmental transfers were not as dramatic, their upward and downward swings were nonetheless considerable, especially for cities. Between 1995 and 2007, city and county transfers grew by 48 and 51 percent, respectively. Between 2007 and 2011, the declines were 25 and 15 percent. Tables 2 and 3 also report mean millage rates, expressed as property taxes owed per $1,000 of taxable value. These rates were stable for both counties and cities between 1995 and 2000, and then moved downward (especially for counties) between 2000 and 2007. Between 2007 and 2011, millage rates went up for both types of local governments. These movements are consistent with the millage rate offset hypothesis, which states that local governments decrease (increase) their millage rates when their tax base is growing (declining) in order to stabilize revenues. But changes in other sources of revenues (such as intergovernmental transfers) and the demand for public services may also cause changes in millage rates, which underscores the importance of using regression analysis to isolate the impact of the tax base on the millage rate. 23 Some of the smaller cities do not report an expenditure for a specific category repeatedly year after year.
Presumably, this is because the city does not make expenditures in this category. In calculating the means and in estimating the regression for the category, the city is dropped entirely from both the balanced and unbalanced panels. However, the regressions were also run including cities with zero values for all years of the category. None of the results were discernibly affected. 24 As noted below, our control variables include population and per capita income. Annual city and county population estimates are provided by the Bureau of Economic and Business Research (BEBR) at the University of Florida. They are Florida's official estimates and are used to allocate state revenue sharing funds to counties and cities. BEBR constructs its population estimates using the housing unit method, in which estimates of population change are derived from estimates of changes in occupied housing units. A detailed description of BEBR's methodology can be found at www.bebr.ufl.edu/sites/default/files/SPR_8_0. pdf. County per capita income is obtained from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Economic Information System, available at http://www.bea.gov. Because annual per capita income is unavailable for cities, we assign cities the income of their county. Because we are first differencing and city and county income are expected to be highly correlated, the use of county income as a proxy for city income is unlikely to have much of an influence on our results.
Means for total, current, and capital expenditures are reported next. All three means moved steadily upward over the years from 1995 to 2007 and then moved downward after 2007. But there were large differences in the sizes of the declines between current and capital expenditures, with current expenditures declining by only about 1 percent and capital expenditures falling by more than 40 percent for both cities and counties. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that when local governments are fis- cally stressed they maintain current expenditures without raising taxes by reducing their capital expenditures.
The rest of the tables are devoted to the individual expenditure categories. 25 For each category mean real per capita expenditures are reported along with the budget share of the category, defined as expenditures in the category divided by total expenditures. The real per capita means show that expenditures in all seven categories for cities and in 10 of the 11 categories for counties grew over the years from 1995 to 2007. The exception for counties was in the Human Services category, where expenditures showed a small decline. After 2007 expenditures within all categories trended downward (except for county Human Services which showed a small upward movement), with the largest percentage declines (roughly 31 percent) occurring within the Culture/Recreation category for both cities and counties. The latter declines are consistent with the idea that local governments consider these services as "less essential" and are therefore quick to cut these expenditures in response to fiscal stress.
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The mean budget share of each category is reported in parentheses. For both cities and counties these shares show considerable stability over time, even after the onset of the GR and housing market crash. This suggests that the post-2007 reductions in total expenditures came more from across-the-board than selective expenditure cuts.
V. ESTIMATED MODELS
While the statistics presented in Tables 2 and 3 describe how selected characteristics of the budgets of counties and cities have changed over time, they do not provide ceteris paribus evidence on the impacts of changes in tax base and intergovernmental transfers -the two principal revenue sources of local governments (both of which are largely beyond their control and therefore can be considered as exogenously determined). To isolate these effects, we estimate millage rate and expenditure equations. In this section we describe the models estimated for cities and counties, in turn. 25 To correctly interpret the county and city expenditures, it is useful to keep in mind that counties provide services to all county residents, regardless of whether they live in a city or not. Generally, cities "add" to these services, more so in some categories in comparison to others. This is particularly true with law enforcement, the largest expenditure within the Public Safety category. County sheriffs provide law enforcement countywide, but almost all Florida cities also have their own police department, whose jurisdiction is limited to the area within the city's boundaries. In the case of some services, however, the county provides the service only to the unincorporated area and the city provides the service for itself. A common example would be waste management. 26 Pension payments to retired law enforcement and fire fighting personnel have received considerable attention in the popular press as a source of local governments' fiscal stress. These payments are included in the current expenditures we report for Public Safety. Although our data do not allow us to separate out these payments, they may account for the fact that between 1995 and 2007 Public Safety expenditures grew more rapidly than total current expenditures, especially for counties. Pension commitments may also explain the relatively small decline in Public Safety expenditures since 2007.
A. City Millage Rate Model
The city millage rate model allows a city's change in its millage rate to depend upon whether its fiscal resources (its tax base and intergovernmental transfers) are moving upward or downward. 27 In line with our theoretical framework, a city's response is also allowed to vary with (1) the previous year's ratio of the city's millage rate to the weighted (by population) average of the millage rates of other cities located within the county; (2) the previous year's ratio of the city's millage rate to the county's millage rate; and (3) the previous year's ratio of the city's population to the county's population.
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A lengthy list of interactions is included in the model to fully capture these possible heterogeneous responses: 
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where B = real property tax base; T = real intergovernmental transfers; UPB = 1 if DB > 0, otherwise UPB = 0; UPT = 1 if DT > 0, otherwise UPT = 0; M = millage rate; OM = the population weighted average of the millage rates of other cities in the county; OE = the population weighted average of the real per capita expenditures of other cities within the county; CM = county millage rate; CE = county real per capita expenditures; P = city population; CP = county population; I = county per capita income; CMUP = 1 if DCM > 0, otherwise CMUP = 0; CMDOWN = 1 if DCM < 0, otherwise 27 Downward observations in the property tax base come largely from the post-GR years of the panels: 84 percent and 88 percent for cities and counties, respectively. In contrast, a majority of the downward observations in intergovernmental transfers occur prior to the GR: 66 percent for both cities and counties. 28 The city to county millage rate ratio may affect a city's millage rate response to a loss in its fiscal resources for the same reason our theoretical model suggests that the city to other cities millage rate ratio may matter. A city competes against both other cities in the county and the unincorporated area of the county for business investment. All Florida counties have large unincorporated areas. and t = year. All variables, other than dummy variables, are expressed in natural logs, which implies that the estimated b coefficients are elasticities.
To control for horizontal competition, (2) includes the previous year's changes in other cities' population weighted averages of millage rates and real per capita expenditures. Vertical competition is accounted for by including the previous year's changes in the county's millage rate and real per capita expenditures. All variables are entered to allow upward and downward movements to have differential effects.
The argument for including lagged changes in the county's tax rate and expenditures in (2) is that city and county services may be related in residents' utility functions. Florida's local governmental geography provides a second argument. All of Florida's counties contain unincorporated areas containing substantial amounts of land area and population. Cities are therefore concerned about capital fleeing to their unincorporated areas, as well as to other cities within the county. Our theory suggests that a city with a tax rate that is low or expenditures that are high relative to the county's will have less fear of losing capital to the unincorporated area if it chooses to respond to losses in its fiscal resources by raising its tax rate or reducing its expenditures.
B. City Total Expenditure Models
The city expenditure models follow the same general design of the millage rate model with the only differences being the millage rate ratios are replaced by ratios of expenditures. Separate models are estimated for total, current, and capital expenditures, all expressed in real per capita values.
C. City Categorical Expenditure Models
Separate models are estimated for each of the seven budget categories defined in Table 1 . The models allow for asymmetric increases and decreases,
j t t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
, ,
where E i,j,t is the natural log of real per capita expenditures in budget category j, and the other variables are as defined above.
D. City Budget Share Models
The budget share of category j equals expenditures in j divided by total expenditures. The change in the jth budget share is regressed on the same right hand side variables entering (3).
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E. County Models
The county millage rate and expenditure models duplicate the city models, with four exceptions: (1) the competitive environment for a county is defined as the constellation of counties that border the county; (2) 
− ; (3) the number of budget categories expands from 7 to 11 because courts are exclusively a county function in Florida; (4) the horizontal competition variables are the population-weighted averages of other constellation counties' millage rates and real per capita expenditures; and (5) the vertical competition variables are the population-weighted averages of city millage rates and real per capita expenditures.
We use the b coefficients obtained from estimating the city and county millage rates and total expenditure models to compute elasticities at the point of means and at the 25 th and 75 th percentiles of the interaction variables. All of these elasticities are for downward movements in the property tax base and intergovernmental transfers. For example, the elasticity of the millage rate with respect to a loss in tax base for a city at the 25 th percentile of the city to county millage rate ratio equals M CM / . By comparing the elasticities at the 25 th and 75 th percentiles of the interaction variable, we can determine the importance that the variable has on a city's millage rate adjustment to a loss in tax base.
VI. RESULTS
In this section we first report the results that pertain to our central question: How do cities and counties respond to a loss in their fiscal resources? We then discuss the findings relevant to a second question of interest: Do local governments react to the tax rate and expenditure decisions of other jurisdictions in making their own tax rate and expenditure decisions? In addition to reporting the elasticities obtained from estimating the models including the interaction variables, we also report at the top of each table the estimated elasticities obtained without the interaction variables. 30 Our categorical expenditure and budget share models are estimated using OLS equation by equation. Alternatively, they could be estimated as a system of equations using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). By accounting for the cross-equation correlation of errors, SUR yields more efficient estimates. However, this is only true if the explanatory variables are different across the equations (Wooldridge, 2002) . In our case where the variables are the same across equations, OLS equation by equation is algebraically equivalent to SUR.
A. Results from Estimating the City Models
The elasticities of the millage rate with respect to downward movements in the property tax base and intergovernmental transfers obtained from estimating the millage rate model for cities are reported in Table 4 . 31 The millage rate elasticities with respect to transfers are all close to zero and are not statistically significant. In contrast, all of the millage rate elasticities with respect to the property tax base fall within a range of 0.2 to 0.3 and all are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level by a two-tailed test. The result that the millage rate elasticities with respect to the tax base are larger than those with respect to transfers is consistent with our expectations (Section III). Cities are hypothesized to temper or avoid millage rate increases in response to a loss in transfers because higher millage rates result in higher property tax payments. The magnitudes of the estimated elasticities with respect to the tax base suggest that cities offset as much as 30 percent of the potential loss in tax revenue from a falling base by raising their millage rates.
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A comparison of the millage rate elasticities computed at the 25 th and 75 th percentiles of the interaction variables shows that two of the three interactions are statistically significant at the 10 percent level or better by a one-tailed test: the ratio of the city's millage rate to the population weighted average of other cities' millage rates and the ratio of the city's population to the county's population. 33 The third interaction variable, the ratio of the city's millage rate to the county's millage rate, is significant at the 12 percent level. The signs of the differences are all consistent with our theoretical model. First, cities with millage rates that are low relative to the millage rates of other cities in the county increase their millage rate by more in response to a loss in tax base. Second, cities with millage rates that are low relative to the county millage rate also increase their millage rate by more in response to a falling tax base. Finally, cities with a greater share of the county's population offset more of a loss in tax base by raising their millage rate. These results strongly conform to the idea that cities with greater monopoly power (and therefore less fear of capital flight) offset a greater percentage of the revenue losses that would occur from a decline in their tax base by raising their millage rate. Table 5 reports the elasticities of expenditures (total, current, and capital) with respect to downward movements in the property tax base and intergovernmental transfers obtained from estimating the expenditure models for cities. The total expenditure elasticities are all positive, indicating that cities cut their total expenditures in response to 32 Our estimate matches the estimate obtained by Alm, Buschman, and Sjoquist (2011) . They used data on Georgia school districts for the years 1997 to 2009 to regress the percentage change in the millage rate on the percentage change in the per capita property tax base, the percentage change in population, the percentage change in per capita income, and a set of year dummy variables. The estimate is also in line with those obtained by Ihlanfeldt and Willardsen (2014) , who provide millage rate offset estimates for a typology of different groups of local governments. Our estimate, however, differs from that of Ross and Yan (2013) , whose results support the residual view of millage rate determination. According to this view, the rate is set to balance the budget once the tax base is known, other revenues are projected, and the level of expenditures is chosen. In other words, the tax rate is mechanically determined and is not a choice variable. An implication of this view is that the elasticity of the tax rate with respect to the tax base is equal to one. The alternative view of tax rate determination is the strategic view which maintains that the tax rate is chosen with an eye toward maintaining and attracting mobile capital. The results we present in this paper provide strong support in favor of the strategic view. 33 A one-tailed test is used to determine the statistical significance of the interaction variables because our theory provides a sign hypothesis.
Table 5
Results from Estimating City Total, Current, and Capital Expenditure Models level or better by a one-tailed test. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
declines in both their tax base and intergovernmental transfers. With only one exception, these elasticities are statistically significant at the 5 percent level or better by a two-tailed test. 34 Except for the singular insignificant elasticity, the tax base elasticities all fall within a range of 0.2 to 0.3, while the transfers elasticities are all slightly larger than 0.1.
In contrast to the estimated millage rate elasticities with respect to a loss in tax base, which are all affected by the interaction variables, only one of the interaction variables is found to have an important effect on how much cities reduce their total expenditures in response to a loss in tax base. Cities at the 25 th percentile of the city to county expenditure ratio are not found to reduce their expenditures in response to a loss in tax base (elasticity = 0.068, p-value = 0.45). In comparison, cities at the 75 th percentile reduce their expenditures by roughly 0.3 percent for a 1 percent decline in the tax base (p-value = 0.001). The results are consistent with the hypothesis that if city expenditures are high relative to county expenditures (conveying monopoly power to the city), the city feels it can cut its expenditures in response to a loss in tax base without having its capital move to the unincorporated portion of the county. The expenditure elasticities with respect to transfers suggest that the interaction variables do not affect a city's response to a loss in its intergovernmental aid.
Current and capital expenditure elasticities are also reported in Table 5 . The current expenditure elasticities are smaller than the total expenditure elasticities, but all are again positive and statistically significant, with a singular exception. 35 While the results show that cities respond similarly to losses in tax base and transfers in adjusting their total and current expenditures, this is not the case for capital expenditures. None of the capital expenditure elasticities with respect to a loss in tax base is statistically significant, while all but one of the capital expenditure elasticities with respect to a loss in transfers are significant at the 10 percent level or better. 36 The latter elasticities all fall within a range of 0.2 to 0.3.
Regarding the effects of the interaction variables on current and capital expenditures, the city current expenditure to county current expenditure ratio is found to affect a city's current expenditure elasticity with respect to a loss in tax base. Cities with high current expenditures in comparison to their county's current expenditures reduce their expenditures by more when their tax base declines. The ratio of city to county capital expenditures is also found to raise the elasticity of capital expenditures with respect to a loss in transfers.
The insignificant capital expenditure elasticities with respect to a loss in tax base versus the significant capital expenditure elasticities with respect to a loss in transfers likely reflects the fact that property tax revenues are unconditional revenues, while 34 The insignificant elasticity is the elasticity computed at the 25 th percentile of the city to county expenditure ratio. 35 The exception is the elasticity computed at the 25 th percentile of the city current expenditure to county current expenditure ratio. 36 The exception is the elasticity computed at the 25 th percentile of the city capital expenditure to county capital expenditure ratio. transfers are frequently grants that are earmarked for specific capital projects. When these grants are eliminated, capital expenditures decline unless cities are able to find alternative sources of funding.
The results from estimating the categorical expenditure models for cities are reported in Table 6 . Neither the real per capita expenditure models nor the budget share models suggest that cities target a particular expenditure category in reducing their total expenditures in response to a loss in tax base. Property tax revenues go into a city's general fund and therefore it is not surprising that in the short run across-the-board cuts are more or less implemented. In contrast, the results obtained for losses in transfers suggest that selective cuts are made. Both Culture/Recreation and Economic Environment expenditures are cut in real per capita amounts and as a share of the budget. While the real per capita expenditure amounts of the Culture/Recreation and Public Safety categories fall the most, there are also decreases in the expenditure amounts of General Government, Physical Environment, and Transportation. While the budget shares of Culture/ Table 6 Results from Estimating City Categorical Expenditure Models Recreation and Economic Environment decline, the share of the budget allocated to Public Safety expands as transfers are lost. Again, these differences in results between a loss in tax base versus a loss in transfers likely reflect restrictions on the use of transfers that do not apply to property tax revenues. The expectation is that the more transfers received by cities are earmarked for certain purposes, the greater the differential effect of a loss in these transfers on the budget categories. Perhaps the most important findings revealed by the estimates reported in Table 6 are that Human Services and Public Safety expenditures appear largely unaffected by either a loss in tax base or a loss in transfers. For Human Services, all of the estimated coefficients are close to zero, except in the real per capita model, where the tax base coefficient is 0.45; however, the estimated standard error is more than twice the size of the estimated coefficient. Where positive, the Public Safety coefficients are all small and insignificant.
B. Results from Estimating the County Models
The results obtained from estimating the millage rate model for counties are reported in Table 7 . The millage rate elasticities with respect to a loss in tax base range between 0.3 and 0.4 and all are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. As is true for cities, the millage rate elasticities with respect to a loss in transfers are negligible in size and statistically insignificant.
Of the two interaction variables (the ratio of the county millage rate to the average millage rate of surrounding counties and the ratio of the county population to the total population of the constellation), only the former variable is statistically significant. 37 Counties with a millage rate that is low relative to those in bordering counties increase their millage rates by more in response to both a loss in tax base and a loss in transfers.
The results from estimating the expenditure models for counties are reported in Table 8 . Both a loss in tax base and a reduction in transfers are found to reduce all three expenditure variables (total, current, and capital). As is true for cities, the current expenditure elasticities with respect to the tax base and transfers are roughly half the size of the total expenditure elasticities. The latter elasticities generally fall within a range of 0.3 to 0.4. In contrast, the capital expenditure elasticities are much larger (1.639 and 1.128 with respect to a loss in tax base and a loss in transfers, respectively), relative to not only the county's current expenditure elasticities but also to both the city's current and capital elasticities. These results are consistent with the means reported in Table  3 , which show large reductions in capital expenditures after the onset of the GR. The results with the interaction variables show that a county decreases its total and current expenditures by more in response to a loss in tax base if its population is a larger share of the population of the constellation.
The results from estimating the categorical expenditure models for counties are reported in Table 9 . The results from estimating the real per capita expenditure models show that a 1 percent decline in the tax base reduces Culture/Recreation expenditures by 0.7 percent, Transportation expenditures by 0.5 percent, and Public Safety expenditures by 0.3 percent. However, the results from estimating the share models show that these reductions are not found to affect the budget shares of these categories. The results from estimating the real per capita expenditure models also show that a 1 percent decline in transfers reduces Transportation expenditures by 1 percent, Economic Environment expenditures by 0.4 percent, Physical Environment expenditures by 0.2 percent, and Public Safety expenditures by 1 percent. 
Table 8
Results from Estimating County Total, Current, and Capital Expenditure Models While a decline in per capita expenditures in a particular category does not always correspond to a shrinkage of the category as a share of the budget, in the case of Transportation expenditures there are large reductions in both per capita amounts (elasticity = 1) and budget share (b = 0.159) as a result of a loss in transfers. In comparison to cities, counties have large transportation budgets, which are largely funded by state and federal grants. Hence, it is not surprising that losses in transfers negatively impact Transportation expenditures. A reduction in the budget share of one category of expenditures implies that the shares of other categories must be expanding. The results show that the large contraction in Transportation's share of the budget causes an expansion in the shares of almost all of the other categories. Our theoretical model suggests that counties, because of their larger size, possess more monopoly power than cities. Based upon their greater monopoly power, counties, in comparison to cities, can raise their millage rates and cut their expenditures by more in response to a loss in fiscal resources without inducing as much capital flight. Hence, we predicted that millage rate and expenditure elasticities would be larger for counties than for cities. The results match these expectations. Regardless of whether we compare millage rate elasticities (with respect to the tax base) or expenditure elasticities (with respect to both the tax base and transfers), in comparison to cities, the county elasticities are larger in absolute magnitude. Focusing on the results obtained from the simpler, non-interactive models, we find that: (1) the millage rate elasticity is 26 percent larger for counties; (2) the current expenditure elasticity with respect to the tax base is 561 percent larger; (3) the current expenditure elasticity with respect to transfers is 88 percent larger; (4) the capital expenditure elasticity with respect to the tax base is 304 percent larger; and (5) the capital expenditure elasticity with respect to transfers is 367 percent larger. 38 The particularly large differences in the capital expenditure elasticities with respect to both the tax base and transfers between cities and counties may reflect the fact that, on average, the capital share of the budget is about 35 percent larger for counties than for cities. It may be harder for cities to find items and projects within their capital budgets that can be readily cut. In addition, counties may find it easier to cut their capital budgets than their current budgets, at least in the short run, given that the state mandates the provision of many services. These services can be maintained in the short run by favoring capital over current expenditure cuts.
Again, it is of interest to focus on the results obtained for the Human Services and Public Safety expenditure categories. The per capita and share model results suggest that Human Services expenditures are unaffected by a loss in either the tax base or transfers. 39 For the Public Safety category, however, the results show that per capita expenditures are reduced in response to a loss in both tax base and transfers. However, the share models indicate that these reductions do not affect the shares of the budget allocated to these expenditures. In fact, the Public Safety share is found to expand in response to a loss in transfers.
C. Intergovernmental Transfers and the Flypaper Effect
The estimated millage rate and expenditure elasticities with respect to downward movements in intergovernmental transfers show that cities and counties do not raise their millage rates to offset a loss in grant revenue. Instead, they cut their expenditures, which is consistent with the flypaper effect, which holds that changes in transfers 38 Shifting the focus to the interactive models and comparing elasticities computed at the point of means has little effect on these comparisons. We choose to discuss the non-interactive model results because these models are more similarly specified for cities and counties. 39 Counties' maintenance of human services expenditures in response to fiscal stress may be attributable to state mandates, because they are largely targeted toward the provision of these services.
cause changes in expenditures in the same direction rather than changes in tax rates in the opposite direction. While both current and capital expenditures are reduced, the capital expenditure elasticities are five to ten times larger than the current expenditure elasticities. In the case of counties, the capital expenditure elasticity is especially large, exceeding unity, which suggests a dollar-for-dollar flypaper effect. These results may be short run in nature and not reflective of a long-run equilibrium. To investigate this, we reestimated the millage rate, current expenditure, and capital expenditure models, adding lagged changes (t -1, t -2, and t -3) in grant revenue to the current change in grant revenue (t). The results are reported in Table 10 . Reported at the bottom of the table is the Long Run Propensity (LRP) elasticity, which is obtained by summing the estimated coefficients on the four grant change variables, along with its estimated robust standard error. Adding the lagged change variables fails to alter our conclusion that losses in intergovernmental transfers have no effect on millage rates. For both cities and counties, the estimated millage rate LRP elasticity with respect to transfers is close to zero and statistically insignificant. The results also show that in the case of current expenditures, the estimated LRP and current year elasticities are similar in size for both governments, as in both the short and long runs, a 1 percent decline in transfers reduces current expenditures by roughly 0.1 percent.
While the millage rate and current expenditure results from adding the lagged changes in grant revenues are essentially the same between cities and counties, this is not the case for capital expenditures. Here the results are markedly different between the two governments. For counties, the LRP capital expenditure elasticity (1.629) is just as large as the current year elasticity (1.488), showing no change in the flypaper effect between the short and long run. In the case of cities, however, initial cuts in capital expenditures are followed after the second year by offsetting increases, resulting in a small, statistically insignificant LRP elasticity. Hence, in contrast to the county flypaper effect, the city effect is only short run in nature.
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D. City and County Interactions
Each of the tax rate and expenditure models includes eight variables to control for horizontal and vertical competition among local governments. The city equations include lagged upward and downward changes in the average millage rate and real per capita expenditures of other cities in the county (horizontal competition) and lagged changes in the county's tax rate and expenditures (vertical competition). Similarly, the county equations include lagged upward and downward changes in the average millage rate and expenditures of other counties in the constellation (horizontal competition) and lagged changes in the average millage rate and expenditures of cities within the county (vertical competition). Listed in Table 11 are those estimated elasticities that are statistically significant at the 10 percent level or better. Overall, the results suggest that the budgetary decisions of cities and counties are affected by both horizontal and vertical competition. A city's millage rate and expenditures are affected by the budgetary decisions of the county and the other cities within the county. Horizontal and vertical competition also affects the county millage rate. County expenditures, however, respond only to the millage rates of the cities within its borders. Also of interest is that our findings are consistent with those reported in the literature. Consistent with Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) and Wu and Hendrick (2009) , we find that city tax rates are positively affected by the tax rates of neighboring cities, and like Wu and Hendrick we find that an increase in the county millage rate lowers the city's millage rate. The results presented in Table 11 also show the importance of allowing upward and downward movements in the taxes and expenditures of other governments to have differing effects on the home jurisdiction. Without exception, it is either the upward or downward change that is statistically significant and never both. In the case of cities, it is only upward movements in other governments' variables that have an effect.
E. Summary of Results Relevant to Our Central Question
In summary, the principal question that we sought to answer is how local governments respond to an exogenous negative shock in their fiscal resources. In the case of cities, our results suggest the following answers to this question:
• In the event of a loss in tax base, cities raise their millage rates and decrease their expenditures. The expenditure cuts come only in their current account. In decreasing their expenditures, no one category appears to be targeted. Arguably, the expenditures having the greatest effect on public welfare are those in the Human Services and Public Safety categories. These expenditures are largely maintained at constant levels.
• In the event of a loss in intergovernmental aid, cities cut their expenditures, especially in their capital accounts, but do not raise their millage rate. The cut in expenditures occurs mostly in the Culture/Recreation and Economic Environment categories, but all categories are affected, except for Human Services and Public Safety. The cut in capital expenditures is purely a short-run phenomenon.
In the case of counties, our results suggest:
• In the event of a loss in tax base, counties, like cities, raise their millage rates and cut their expenditures. However, in contrast to cities, where the cut in expenditures comes entirely from the current account, the cuts made by counties are largely in the capital account. The decline in expenditures comes primarily from less spending in the categories of Culture/Recreation, Transportation, and Public Safety.
• In the event of a loss in intergovernmental aid, the results for counties again largely match those obtained for cities, as there is no increase in the millage rate, expenditures are cut, and once again the percentage reduction in capital expenditures is about five times larger than the percentage reduction in current expenditures. However, there are two notable differences between the results obtained for the two governments. First, in contrast to cities, the cut in capital expenditures persists into the long run. Second, the cut in expenditures comes largely from a reduction in transportation expenditures.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has investigated the ways cities and counties respond to a loss in their two major fiscal resources -the property tax base and intergovernmental transfers. A major theme is that these responses depend on the monopoly power possessed by these local governments. We hypothesized that counties, because of their larger size, have more monopoly power than cities, which would lead counties to increase their millage rates and decrease their expenditures by more than cities in response to a loss in fiscal resources. Our results, obtained from estimating first differenced panel data models for Florida cities and counties, are consistent with our hypotheses.
We also found that the responses of cities and counties to a loss in fiscal resources vary as a function of their competitive environments. A city increases its millage rate by more in response to a loss in tax base if its rate is low in comparison to the rates of other cities in the county or to its county's rate. It also increases its rate by more if it has a large share of the county's population. A county increases its millage rate by more in response to a loss in tax base if its rate is low relative to the rates of other counties within its constellation. It also cuts its expenditures by more if it has a larger share of the population of the constellation. These findings are all predicted by our theoretical model and lend additional support to our monopoly power hypothesis. Overall, while our results demonstrate the importance of monopoly power in explaining the heterogeneity that exists across cities and counties in their response to a loss in fiscal resources, our findings generally conform to those of earlier studies, which suggest that in response to fiscal pressure local governments raise their millage rate and cut their expenditures, but the cuts are mainly in the capital rather than the current account and do not jeopardize the provision of essential public services.
Regarding future research, it is important to determine whether our results apply only to Florida or to other states as well. Since all local governments wish to retain and attract mobile capital, we expect that the importance of a local government's monopoly power in fashioning its response to a loss in its fiscal resources would be universal. Nevertheless, there is an obvious need to investigate how local governments in other states respond to exogenous negative shocks in their revenue sources. It is also important to focus on central cities. At the local level, these governments bear the greatest responsibility for providing human services to the poor, aged, and disabled. They also have the greatest need to maintain public safety expenditures in light of their higher crime rates. Hence, it is important to determine whether they cut core services in response to losses in their fiscal resources. Also of interest is the possibility that central cities may possess monopoly power that rivals that of the counties in our sample. Like counties, central cities are larger than the average city. In addition, extant evidence suggests that central cities provide unique agglomeration economies that may further strengthen their monopoly power. 41 Future research should investigate whether central cities behave more like the average county or the average city that we have investigated.
Another important area for future inquiry is to investigate whether the fiscal stress attributable to the GR caused local governments to make structural changes in revenue collection or service provision. Possible restructuring could include the privatization of selected services, the formation of special districts, service area consolidations, and the adoption of new taxes or fees for services.
Our final suggestion for future research is to replicate our analysis for the third type of local government -school districts. To our knowledge, there is no information, even from surveys of school administrators, on how school districts responded to the fiscal pressures created by the GR or to other fiscal crises. Since education is arguably the most important service provided by local government, we recommend that our last suggestion for future research be given the highest priority.
